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The prevalence of code injection attacks has led to
the wide adoption of exploit mitigations based on non-
executable memory pages. In turn, attackers are increas-
ingly relying on return-oriented programming (ROP) to by-
pass these protections. At the same time, existing detection
techniques based on shellcode identification are oblivious
to this new breed of exploits, since attack vectors may not
contain binary code anymore. In this paper, we present a
detection method for the identification of ROP payloads in
arbitrary data such as network traffic or process memory
buffers. Our technique speculatively drives the execution of
code that already exists in the address space of a targeted
process according to the scanned input data, and identifies
the execution of valid ROP code at runtime. Our experi-
mental evaluation demonstrates that our prototype imple-
mentation can detect a broad range of ROP exploits against
Windows applications without false positives, while it can
be easily integrated into existing defenses based on shell-
code detection.
1 Introduction
The exploitation of memory corruption vulnerabilities in
server and client applications has been one of the prevalent
means of system compromise and malware infection. By
supplying a malicious input to the target application, an at-
tacker can inject and execute arbitrary code, known as shell-
code, in the context of the vulnerable process. Fortunately,
the wide adoption of non-executable memory page protec-
tions like Data Execution Prevention (DEP) [11] in recent
versions of popular OSes has reduced the impact of con-
ventional code injection attacks.
In turn, attackers have started adopting a new exploita-
tion technique, widely known as return-oriented program-
ming (ROP) [17], which allows the execution of arbitrary
code on a victim system without the need to inject any code.
In the same spirit as in the return-to-libc exploitation tech-
nique [19], return-oriented programming relies on the exe-
cution of code that already exists in the address space of the
process. In contrast to return-to-libc though, instead of exe-
cuting the code of a whole library function, return-oriented
programming is based on the combination of tiny code frag-
ments, dubbed gadgets, scattered throughout the code seg-
ments of the process. The execution order of the gadgets
is controlled through a sequence of gadget addresses that
is part of the attack payload. This means that an attacker
can execute arbitrary code on the victim system by inject-
ing only control data.
Besides the effective circumvention of non-executable
page protections, return-oriented programming also poses
significant challenges to a broad range of defenses that are
based on shellcode detection [4, 13–15, 18, 21, 24, 25]. The
main idea behind these approaches is to execute valid in-
struction sequences found in the inspected data on a CPU
emulator, and identify characteristic behaviors exhibited
by different shellcode types using runtime heuristics. Be-
sides the detection of code injection attacks at the network
level [13–15, 18, 25], shellcode identification has been used
for in-browser detection of drive-by download attacks [8,9],
as well as malicious document scanning [18, 22].
In a ROP exploit, however, in place of the shellcode, the
attack vector contains just a chunk of data—to which we
refer as the ROP payload—comprising the addresses of the
gadgets to be executed along with any necessary instruc-
tion arguments. Since there is no injected binary code to
identify, existing emulation-based shellcode detection tech-
niques are ineffective against ROP attacks. At the same
time, return-oriented programming is increasingly used in
the wild to broaden the targets of exploits against Acrobat
Reader and other popular applications, extending the infec-
tion coverage of recent exploit packs [5].
As a step towards filling this gap, we present a new tech-
nique for the detection of ROP exploits based on the iden-
tification of the ROP payload that is contained in the at-
tack vector. ROPscan, our prototype implementation, uses
a code emulator to speculatively execute code fragments
that already exist in the address space of a targeted process.
The execution is driven by valid memory addresses that are
found in the injected payload, and which could possibly
point to the actual gadgets of a malicious ROP code. We
have evaluated ROPscan using an array of publicly avail-
able ROP exploits against Windows applications, as well as
with a vast amount of benign data. Our results show that
ROPscan can accurately detect existing ROP exploits with-
out false positives, while it achieves an order of magnitude
higher throughput compared to Nemu [13, 14], an existing
shellcode detector with which ROPscan shares the code em-
ulation engine.
Current exploits use ROP code only as a first step to by-
pass memory protections and to enable the execution of a
second-level conventional shellcode, which is included in
the same attack vector and thus can be identified by existing
shellcode detectors. However, the embedded shellcode can
easily be kept unexposed through a simple packing scheme,
and get dynamically decrypted by a tiny ROP-based decryp-
tion routine, similarly to simple polymorphic shellcode en-
gines. It has also been demonstrated that return-oriented
programming can be used to execute arbitrary code [17],
and thus future exploits may rely solely on ROP-based ma-
licious code.
In any case, the ability to identify the presence of ROP
code can increase the detection accuracy of current defenses
that rely only on shellcode detection. ROPscan can inspect
arbitrary data, which allows its easy integration into existing
detectors—we present two case studies in which we have
used ROPscan as part of a network-level attack detector and
a malicious PDF scanner.
2 Background and Related Work
The ability to identify the presence of shellcode in arbi-
trary data inputs, such as network traffic [12–15,18,21,23–
25], process buffers [8,9,22], or memory dumps [18], offers
an effective way to detect a broad range of code injection at-
tacks. This alleviates the need to take into consideration the
specifics of the exploitation method used, or the actual vul-
nerability being exploited—the mere presence of shellcode
in a network request, a memory buffer, or a malicious file
denotes suspicious activity.
Initial shellcode detection approaches used code disas-
sembly on network streams to identify the NOP sled [21]
or the shellcode itself [12, 23]. Static code analysis though
is not effective in the presence of code obfuscation or self-
modifying code, techniques that are widely used for shell-
code packing and polymorphism. Dynamic code analysis
using emulation can effectively handle even highly obfus-
cated code, and therefore has been used extensively for
shellcode detection [4, 13–15, 18, 24, 25].
As ROP code has started replacing conventional shell-
code in recent exploits, in this work we build on the concept
of dynamic code analysis with the goal to detect the pres-
ence of ROP payloads in arbitrary inputs. Our prototype
Figure 1. Example of ROP code taken from
an exploit against Adobe Reader (CVE-2010-
0188). The execution of the gadgets (right)
is driven by the arrangement of gadget ad-
dresses and embedded data in the ROP pay-
load (left). Arrows denote read accesses to
payload data, and numbers correspond to the
order of the executed instructions.
system is based on Nemu [13, 14], a shellcode detector that
uses a CPU emulator to identify the execution behavior of
various shellcode types using different runtime heuristics.
During execution, the shellcode may access data that al-
ready exist in the address space of the vulnerable process.
To execute shellcode correctly, Nemu uses a fully-blown
virtual memory subsystem that can be initialized with a
snapshot of the complete address space of a real process.
We take advantage of this feature to speculatively trigger
the execution of gadgets that already exist in the executable
memory segments of the vulnerable application we aim to
protect, according to the ROP payload in the attack vector.
Each gadget of the ROP code transfers control to the next
one through an indirect control transfer instruction—the fi-
nal one in its sequence of “useful” instructions. The target
addresses are read sequentially from the sequence of gadget
addresses contained in the injected ROP payload, as shown
in the example of Figure 1.
The gadgets usually end with a ret instruction—hence
the name of the technique [17]—although any other indi-
rect jump instruction can be used [6]. The ret instruction
is a perfect fit for transferring control to the next gadget
because it actually performs two operations at once: sets
the instruction pointer (EIP) to the address contained in the
memory location pointed to by the stack pointer (esp), and
increments the stack pointer by four bytes (assuming an ad-
dress size of 32 bits). This allows esp to be used as an
“index” register for transferring control to the desired gad-
get according to the list of addresses in the ROP payload.
3 Approach
Our goal is to identify the presence of a ROP payload
in arbitrary data, such as network traffic streams or process
memory buffers. Each input is simply treated as a sequence
of bytes, without any knowledge about the actual type or
structure of the data. Consequently, if an input actually
contains a ROP payload, its location is initially unknown.
ROPscan searches the whole input to identify sequences of
valid addresses that, when treated as a ROP payload, yield
an actual execution path that spans several gadgets.
3.1 Setting up the Environment
To execute the sequence of gadgets used in an exploit,
ROPscan should have access to the executable memory seg-
ments of the targeted process in which the gadgets reside.
For this reason, the virtual address space of the emulator
is initialized with a snapshot of the process memory from a
real instance of each application we aim to protect. Multiple
address spaces can coexist at the same time by maintaining
a set of different page tables. This is useful in case an input
needs to be checked in the context of more than one vulner-
able processes.
Consider for example the case of a PDF file scanner, as
the one described in Section 5.2. Different versions of Ac-
robat Reader may have the same DLL mapped into different
addresses, and more than likely there will be differences in
the actual code of some segments. The construction of ROP
code is based on a particular static memory layout of the tar-
geted application, and even a slight variation in one of the
gadgets may break its execution. Exploits also may load on
demand DLLs or executable components that are not loaded
by default by the application. It is thus desirable to be able
to check the same buffer for ROP payloads that would be
valid in the context of different versions of Acrobat Reader,
i.e., different memory layouts. Besides different versions of
the same application, in other settings, such as the network-
level detector described in Section 5.1, an input may also be
inspected in the context of several different applications.
3.2 Speculative Execution
A working ROP exploit should contain a sequence of
valid memory addresses in its ROP payload, each pointing
to an actual gadget in the executable address space of the
targeted process. A key characteristic of ROP code is that it
relies on gadgets that exist in the non-ASLR code segments
of the process, which remain static across different process
instances or system configurations.
These segments are often a small subset of all allocated
pages, which in turn are a subset of the whole virtual ad-
dress space of a process (2GB for the default configurations
of 32-bit Windows). We collectively refer to all the non-
volatile memory segments of a process that have execute
permission as its gadget space.
For randomized processes, the gadget space is even
smaller, usually comprising the code segments of just a few
non-ASLR DLLs. For the application and OS combina-
tions we tested, the gadget space ranges from 28KB to just
17.71MB, as shown in Table 1. This means that the proba-
bility of an arbitrary address to fall within the gadget space
is significantly low. Note that for 64-bit systems, this proba-
bility is even smaller due to the massive size of the available
address space. In this work, we focus on 32-bit processes,
since even in 64-bit versions of Windows the most com-
monly exploited applications are still 32-bit.
Based on the above observation, the first step of the de-
tection algorithm is to identify potential gadget addresses
within the scanned input. This is achieved by advancing
a 4-byte sliding window one byte at a time, and check-
ing whether the 32-bit address that corresponds to the cur-
rent location of the window falls within the gadget space of
any of the protected applications. In the common case, a
random address will fall either into an unmapped or non-
executable memory page, or in the kernel address space
(upper 2GB of the total 4GB), as shown in Figure 2(a). Ad-
dress 0072F741 is not mapped, and the sliding window
advances to the next byte of the input.
If the address falls into the gadget space of a process,
then this may denote the beginning of a ROP payload. In
that case, ROPscan assumes that the address corresponds to
the first gadget of the ROP code, and speculatively starts
executing the code that exists at that address. Figure 2(b)
illustrates the moment at which the sliding window reaches
the first gadget address of the payload shown in the exam-
ple of Figure 1. The address falls into the gadget space
of the process (specifically, in the code segment of Adobe
Reader’s BIB.dll, which is the sole source of the gadgets
used in this particular exploit), so EIP is loaded with ad-
dress 070072F7 (the bytes of which are in reverse order
in the payload due to endianness).
As discussed in Section 2, for the proper execution of
the ROP code, the attacker needs to control both the EIP
and esp registers. The latter is crucial for the correct trans-
fer of control to the second gadget after the first one has
completed. For this reason, before the beginning of a new
execution, the esp register is set to point right after the
four bytes of the first gadget’s address in the input buffer, as
shown in Figure 2(b). This corresponds to the state of the
vulnerable process right after the flow of control has been
hijacked, and is usually the outcome of a stack pivot in-
struction sequence [10, 26] (for exploits in which the stack
pointer does not happen to point right at the beginning of
the ROP payload).
In this example, the first gadget pops the next 4-byte
Figure 2. Overview of the scanning process. If the 4-byte value at the current position does not
correspond to a mapped executable memory page, the sliding window advances one byte (a). When
a valid address is found, EIP and esp are initialized appropriately and a new execution begins (b).
value from the ROP payload into eax, and transfers con-
trol to the next gadget through the ret instruction. The
execution continues normally as long as each gadget ma-
nipulates the stack pointer correctly, and may terminate for
one of the following reasons: i) a gadget transfers control to
an invalid address, ii) the emulator encounters an invalid or
privileged instruction, iii) the number of executed instruc-
tions in the current gadget reaches a certain threshold, or iv)
the total number of executed instructions reaches an overall
execution threshold.
The second condition is possible due to the variable-
length instruction set of the x86 architecture. For example,
a random address in a benign input may fall into the middle
of an actual instruction in one of the code segments. That
byte may correspond to the opcode of a privileged instruc-
tion that only the kernel is allowed to execute.
The third condition helps distinguishing between ran-
dom code and actual ROP code. The typical size of the
gadgets used in Turing-complete implementations [6, 17],
as well as in the exploits we tested, ranges between 2–5 in-
structions, while the largest number of executed instructions
in a single gadget that we observed is 10 instructions (EDB-
ID 16619 in Table 1). We have conservatively set a gadget
threshold of 32 instructions.
The final execution threshold ensures that the execution
will stop in case the flow of control has been “trapped” into
a loop or an overly long straight-through code path. Al-
though the largest number of executed instructions in the
ROP exploits we have encountered so far is less than 500,
we have set a conservative threshold of 4096 instructions.
3.3 Runtime Detection
It is common for a totally benign input to contain one or
more 4-byte values that fall within the gadget space, and
which consequently point to valid instruction sequences.
Depending on their arrangement in the input buffer and the
final instruction of each sequence, a benign input may result
in an execution chain of “accidental” gadgets that exhibits a
ROP-like behavior. For the accurate detection of real ROP
payloads, we need to be able to distinguish between the ac-
cidental execution of random instruction sequences and the
actual execution of real gadgets. This is achieved using a
runtime heuristic that precisely matches the execution be-
havior of ROP code.
We observe that the transfer of control to a subsequent
gadget is always achieved through an indirect branch in-
struction, and its control data is always derived from the
injected ROP payload. That is, the branch instruction itself
(in case of ret, as shown in Figure 1), or some previously
executed instruction in the same gadget (in case of indirect
jmp or call), reads the destination address from the ROP
payload. For example, gadgets that end with a non-ret in-
struction [6] use a sequence like pop eax; jmp eax;
to first read the destination address from the payload and
then jump to it. Therefore, we consider that the execution
of an instruction sequence corresponds to an actual gadget
if it ends with an indirect control transfer instruction that
uses control data derived from the original input buffer.1
During the execution of an instruction sequence, if a jmp
eax instruction transfers control to another valid location in
the gadget space, but the value of eax has not been loaded
from the input buffer, then this sequence is clearly not a
gadget. Similarly, consider a relative call instruction that
transfers control a few bytes further from the current loca-
tion of EIP, followed at some point by a ret instruction.
In this case, ret does not denote the end of a gadget al-
though it reads an address from the payload and jumps to
it, because the value read is not the original value that ex-
1In case a dispatcher gadget is used [6], gadgets first transfer control to
it using a previously initialized register. Only the dispatcher gadget reads
the next destination address from the payload and jumps to it. This does
not pose any problem to our definition of a gadget’s execution because the
dispatcher gadget will be considered as part of the previous gadget.
isted at that location of the input buffer, but the return ad-
dress pushed at runtime by the call instruction (each ex-
ecution starts with a “clean” version of the original buffer
using copy-on-write).
The above definition captures an essential property of the
execution behavior of a gadget, which is rarely encountered
during the execution of random code. Indeed, although it is
very common for a benign input to contain addresses that
correspond to random gadget-like instruction sequences, it
is much less probable that one of these sequences will hap-
pen to read another valid destination address from the orig-
inal input and transfer control to it—but sometimes, this
may happen as well.
Fortunately, the ROP code of an exploit will rely on a
set of several different gadgets, and there should be an un-
interrupted flow of control from one to the other. Given that
the same gadget can be executed several times (e.g., the sec-
ond gadget at address 070015BB in Figure 1) our detection
heuristic is based on the number of unique gadgets that are
encountered during the same execution chain. Although it is
possible that a benign input will result to the execution of a
few consecutive gadgets, setting a higher detection thresh-
old provides for a robust detection heuristic that precisely
captures the runtime behavior of ROP code. In the follow-
ing section, we discuss how we can set this threshold so as
to accurately detect existing ROP exploits, while practically
eliminating the possibility of false positives.
4 Experimental Evaluation
We begin our evaluation by focusing on the resilience of
the detection heuristic against false positives through stress-
testing with benign data. We then test the detection effec-
tiveness of ROPscan using existing ROP payloads, and fi-
nally discuss runtime performance and optimization issues.
4.1 Tuning the Detection Threshold
To assess the accuracy of ROPscan’s detection heuristic,
we tested our prototype implementation using a large and
diverse set of benign data. Our aim is to verify the intuition
that the execution patterns of the random code that can be
triggered by valid addresses—which unavoidably occur in
benign inputs—will not match the runtime behavior of the
ROP code used in current exploits. This is crucial for ensur-
ing that benign data are not falsely identified as containing
a ROP payload.
The test inputs consist of randomly generated data, as
well as real benign data. Specifically, we used a sim-
ple program that continuously generates inputs of varying
size between 4–16KB with uniformly random binary and
ASCII content. The data were fed directly to ROPscan,
which inspected 100 million inputs of each type, totalling
Gadgets



















Figure 3. Percentage of benign inputs with a
given maximum number of unique gadgets in
the same execution chain.
about 1.86TB of data. We also used traces of real network
traffic captured at the access link of two production net-
works. The data set consists of about 7 million reassem-
bled TCP streams with a maximum size of 64KB, totalling
more than 196GB. Finally, we analyzed 923 benign PDF
files with embedded JavaScript code using MDscan [22],
and dumped the contents of the memory buffers allocated
by the JavaScript interpreter that had a size larger than 128
bytes.
For each input, we measure the maximum number of
unique gadgets that happen to be executed as part of a single
execution chain, according to the runtime pattern definition
discussed in the previous section. To stress the detection
algorithm, the emulator has been initialized with snapshots
of multiple processes, which correspond to the applications
listed in Table 1. This slightly increases the probability that
a random address will fall into the combined gadget space
of all processes.
Figure 3 shows the percentage of inputs with a given
maximum number of unique gadgets in the same execution.
For all kinds of data, about 7–10% of the inputs cause the
execution of a single gadget. As discussed, a random in-
struction sequence is considered as a gadget only if it ends
with an indirect branch with control data derived from the
payload. Of course, the vast majority of the inputs trigger
many other execution chains, but most of the time these do
not end with a valid indirect branch, or are terminated due
to the execution thresholds. The percentage of inputs with
two gadgets ranges from 0.02% for memory buffers to 2.7%
for random binary data, while an extremely small amount of
inputs resulted to the execution of three gadgets.
In these experiments, as well as previous preliminary
tests, we never observed a benign input with more than three
unique gadgets. This means that, for the data sets we have
used so far, setting a detection threshold of four gadgets
will never result in a false positive. Although we can never
rule out the possibility of a false identification in another set
of data or an actual long-term deployment, it is possible to
raise the detection threshold even higher in order to increase
the robustness or ROPscan against false alarms. Based on
the results of the analysis of real ROP exploits that follows,
the minimum number of unique gadgets used in the pub-
licly available exploits we tested is eight, which allows for
an execution threshold of up to eight gadgets.
We should note that there are several ways in which
the detection heuristic could be strengthened even further
in terms of accuracy. For instance, by manually analyzing
the instructions of the instances with three unique gadgets,
we observed that more than two thirds of them were due to
three identical (but located in different addresses, and thus
unique) single-instruction gadgets, each consisting solely
of a ret instruction. Single-instruction gadgets alone can-
not achieve anything useful other than advancing the stack
pointer, so we could strengthen the heuristic by requiring
the execution of a certain amount of gadgets with at least
two or more instructions.
Furthermore, the current allowable maximum gadget
length of 32 instructions is a quite conservative value, as
discussed in Section 3.2, and could be lowered. About one
third of the random gadgets in the tested benign inputs were
overly long, between 16–32 instructions, and their execu-
tion could have been avoided by setting a lower maximum
gadget length.
4.2 Detection Effectiveness
We evaluated the detection effectiveness of ROPscan us-
ing a set of eight publicly available ROP exploits against
Windows applications. All exploits use a first-stage ROP
code to bypass DEP and execute an embedded second-
stage shellcode. Details about the exploits are listed in
Table 1. The exploits are available through the Exploit
Database [2] using the corresponding EDB-ID, and most of
them are also included in Metasploit [3]. We also used four
generic ROP payload implementations for bypassing Win-
dows DEP [1, 7]. Two of them are based on gadgets from
msvcr71.dll, a DLL that is included in (and remains
static across) many popular applications [1].
For each exploit, we isolated the attack vector that con-
tains the ROP payload, and fed it to ROP scan, which in
all cases identified the beginning of the payload correctly.
The last two columns in the table correspond to the total
number of executed gadgets and the number of unique gad-
gets, respectively. When considering the detection heuris-
tic used in ROPscan, in the worst case, one of the exploits
against Adobe Reader uses just eight gadgets for its ROP
code. When combined with the results of Section 4.1, this
gives us a range of possible values for the detection thresh-
old between 4–8 gadgets. A median value of six gadgets
strikes a good balance between increased resilience to false
positives, and the ability to detect even smaller ROP code
implementations.
Note that in these exploits ROP code is used only to cir-
cumvent DEP, and the actual malicious functionality is car-
ried out by conventional shellcode. A fully-blown ROP-
based implementation of the same functionality or the addi-
tion of a decryption routine would probably require a larger
number of gadgets.
4.3 Runtime Performance and Optimiza-
tions
The most CPU-intensive operation in ROPscan is the
emulated execution of the code that is triggered whenever
a new address from the input falls within the gadget space.
Fortunately, the total size of the gadget space even when
multiple process images are used is usually just a few tens
of megabytes, as shown in Table 1, which is a fraction of
the 4GB of addressable space using a 32-bit address.
Even whenever an execution chain is spawned, it usually
ends very soon, as the occurrence of long valid instruction
sequences is quite rare. This allows ROPscan to achieve
a high raw processing throughput, despite the reliance on
CPU-intensive interpretive emulation, which in our exper-
iments exceeded 120Mbit/s on average. This allows it to
be easily used in tandem with the legacy shellcode detec-
tion heuristics of Nemu, which achieve about an order of
magnitude lower throughput [13].
Implementing the detection algorithm of ROPscan in a
shellcode detection system like ShellOS [18], which ex-
ecutes the inspected code using native execution through
virtualization, would allow for a much higher processing
throughput. Additionally, there is room for further perfor-
mance optimizations in the detection approach itself. For
instance, not all addresses in the gadget space correspond to
actual gadgets. In fact, usually just a fraction of them point
to useful instruction sequences. Assuming a given maxi-
mum gadget length, potential valid gadget addresses can be
pre-marked in the address space of the emulator, e.g., with
the aid of a gadget discovery tool [17, 20]. Then, instead of
blindly attempting an execution whenever an address from
the input happens to fall anywhere within the gadget space,
ROPscan will consider for execution only the addresses that
point to actual pre-marked gadgets, reducing significantly
the cycles spent on code emulation.
5 Use Cases
The main detection engine of ROPscan can inspect and
identify the presence of ROP payloads in arbitrary inputs.
Tested Gadget Executed Unique
Exploit/Payload CVE EDB-ID Platform Space Gadgets Gadgets
Adobe Reader v9.3.0 2010-0188 16670 Windows XP SP3 17.7MB 47 8
Adobe Reader v9.3.0 2010-1297 16687 Windows XP SP3 17.7MB 60 12
Adobe Reader v9.3.4 2010-2883 16619 Windows 7 SP1 864KB 33 10
Adobe Reader v9.3.4 2010-3654 16667 Windows XP SP3 17.7MB 60 12
Winamp v5.572 - 14068 Windows 7 SP1 5.7MB 126 21
Integard Pro v2.2.0 - 15016 Windows 7 SP1 724KB 165 16
Mplayer Lite r33064 - 17124 Windows 7 SP1 6.4MB 179 16
All to MP3 Converter v2.0 - 17252 Windows XP SP3 9.4MB 388 16
msvcr71.dll [1] - - Windows 7 SP1 228KB 11 9
msvcr71.dll [7] - - Windows 7 SP1 228KB 12 11
mscorie.dll [1] - - Windows 7 SP1 28KB 9 9
mfc71u.dll [7] - - Windows 7 SP1 872KB 15 10
Table 1. Details of the tested ROP exploits [2,3] and generic ROP payloads [1,7].
This allows it to be used in a broad range of attack detec-
tion and analysis systems. In this section, we discuss two
different settings in which we have used ROPscan to detect
network-level attacks and malicious documents. We expect
that ROPscan will be easy to incorporate in other shellcode
detectors as well [4, 18, 24].
5.1 Network-level Detection
Shellcode identification has been widely used for code
injection attack detection at the network level [13–15, 18,
25]. The ability to identify ROP payloads can extend the
range of attacks that these systems can detect, especially
for next-generation attacks that may rely on ROP-only im-
plementations of their malicious code.
ROPscan has been implemented on top of the detection
engine of Nemu [13,14], which already has a network-level
detection component based on passive network monitoring.
In this setting, ROPscan can detect ROP payloads in the raw
network data that are transmitted through a TCP stream. For
instance, the attack vector of the exploit against Integard Pro
(a filtering proxy server) is just a POST request to the web
interface of the application that triggers a buffer overflow.
Similarly, the exploits against the media player applications
in Table 1 are based on malicious media files that take con-
trol of the application when opened. The ROP payload is
contained in the raw data of the file, which can easily be
transmitted to potential victims over the network.
For all above exploits, ROPscan was able to detect the
ROP payload by scanning the attack traffic. Actually, each
input is inspected twice, since Nemu also applies its run-
time shellcode detection heuristics, which are based on the
execution of network data itself. Shellcode detection using
emulation is much more CPU-intensive compared to ROP
payload detection, and thus the additional overhead due to
ROPscan is negligible.
5.2 PDF Scanning
Return-oriented programming has been widely used in
exploits against Adobe Reader, which has full DEP support
since version 9.2.0. As shown in Table 1, one version can
be successfully exploited even in Windows 7, since a few
third-party DLLs do not support ASLR.
We incorporated ROPscan in MDScan [22], a malicious
PDF scanner based on shellcode detection. MDScan ex-
tracts any JavaScript code contained in the scanned docu-
ment and executes it on a JavaScript emulator. Most of the
exploits against Adobe Reader use JavaScript code to trig-
ger a memory corruption vulnerability and execute the em-
bedded code. MDScan inspects each newly allocated mem-
ory buffer in the context of the JavaScript interpreter for the
presence of shellcode. As with in the case of the network-
level detector, with the addition of ROPscan each buffer is
also scanned for the presence of ROP payloads.
We generated malicious PDFs of all four Adobe Reader
exploits using Metasploit [3]. From these exploits, only
CVE-2010-0188 does not rely on JavaScript, and thus its
malicious payload is not exposed to MDScan. The ROP
code of all three other exploits was successfully detected.
Our preliminary tests with actual in-the-wild malicious
PDFs have also been positive.
MDScan inspects only JavaScript buffers, which limits
its detection capabilities against malicious PDFs that do not
rely on JavaScript code. However, ROPscan can easily be
used in other types of detectors that either scan all mem-
ory buffers of a process at runtime using library interposi-
tion [16], or scan raw dumps of specific memory areas [18].
6 Conclusion
Attackers always seek new ways to evade detection sys-
tems and bypass protection mechanisms. Return-oriented
programming is increasingly used in the wild in exploits
against Windows applications to circumvent DEP, facili-
tated in part by the lack of full support for address space
layout randomization in many vulnerable applications. The
detection algorithm of ROPscan can identify the presence of
ROP payloads in arbitrary inputs, and the results of our ex-
perimental evaluation demonstrate that it can easily extend
the detection capabilities of existing defenses that are based
solely on the detection of conventional shellcode. As part
of our future work, we plan to explore possible optimiza-
tions in the performance and accuracy of the core detection
algorithm, and incorporate it in other existing detectors.
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